) reveals that although only 30% of investment professionals already use products tracking smart-beta indices, more than one third of respondents are considering investing in such products in the near future. 1 This article argues that current smart-beta investment approaches only provide a partial answer to the main shortcomings of capitalization-weighted indices and develops a new approach to equity investing, referred to as smart-factor investing. It then provides an assessment of the benefits of simultaneously addressing the two main problems of capweighted indices (their undesirable factor exposures and their heavy concentration) by constructing factor indices that explicitly seek exposures to rewarded risk factors while diversifying away unrewarded risks.
The results suggest that such smartfactor indices lead to considerable improvements in risk-adjusted performance. For long-term U.S. data, smart-factor indices for a range of different factor tilts roughly double the Sharpe ratio of the broad capweighted index. Outperformance of such indices persists at levels ranging from 2.92% to 4.46%, even when assuming unrealistically high transaction costs. Moreover, by providing explicit tilts to consensual factors, such indices improve upon many current smart-beta offerings, where more often than not, factor tilts result as unintended consequences of ad hoc methodologies. In fact, this article shows that by using consensual results from asset pricing theory concerning both the existence of factor premia and the importance of diversification, it is possible to go beyond existing smart-beta approaches that provide partial solutions by only addressing one of these issues.
Asset pricing theory, in fact, suggests that there are two main challenges involved in a sound approach to equity investing. The first challenge is the efficient diversification of unrewarded risks, where "diversification" means "reduction" or "cancellation" (as in "diversify away"). Indeed, unrewarded risks are by definition not attractive for investors who are inherently risk-averse and therefore only willing to take risks if there is an associated reward to be expected in exchange for such risk taking, as shown by Harry Markowitz in his seminal work on portfolio diversification (Markowitz [1952] ). 2 The second challenge is the efficient diversification of rewarded risks. Here the goal is not to diversify away rewarded risk exposures so as to eventually eliminate or at least minimize them, because this would imply giving up on the risk premia. The goal is instead to efficiently allocate to rewarded risk factors, so as to achieve the highest reward per unit of risk. In William Sharpe's [1964] CAPM, there is a single rewarded risk factor, so the second challenge is nonexistent, and the only focus should be on holding a well-diversified proxy for the market portfolio. In a multi-factor world, where the equity risk premium is multi-dimensional (including not only market risk, but also size, B/M, momentum, volatility, and so on), an important component of an investor's equity investment process is the determination of the appropriate (e.g., Sharpe ratio-maximizing) allocation to these rewarded risk exposures.
This analysis of the dual challenges to rational equity investing is enlightening with respect to a proper understanding of the intrinsic shortcomings of cap-weighted (CW) indices that are typically used as default investment benchmarks by asset owners and asset managers. On the one hand, CW indices are ill-suited investment benchmarks, because they tend to be concentrated portfolios that contain an excessive amount of unrewarded risk. On the other hand, CW indices implicitly embed a bundle of factor exposures that are highly unlikely to be optimal for any investor, if only because they have not been explicitly controlled for. For example, CW indices show by construction a large-cap bias and a growth bias, while the academic literature has instead shown that small cap and value are where we find positively rewarded risk exposures.
This analysis also sheds light on the benefits and shortcomings of existing alternatives to CW indices. Broadly speaking, there have been two main innovations in the recent years. On the one hand, a number of index providers have launched so-called smart indices, or smart-beta indices, which focus on addressing the first shortcoming of CW indices: their excessive concentration, which leads to an excessive presence of unrewarded risk. Such smart-beta indices include various approaches that are based either on scientific diversification (e.g., indices aiming at implementing a minimum variance or maximum Sharpe ratio allocation to selected stocks, subject to a number of constraints either on weights or on parameter estimates, which are meant to improve the robustness of the portfolio-construction methodology) or naïve diversification (equal-dollar contribution or equal-risk contribution indices). 3 One problem with these smart-beta indices, however, is that they fail to address the second problem: the explicit control of rewarded risk exposures. Hence, by switching from a CW index to an EW or GMV index, for example, the investor switches from one arbitrary bundle of factor exposures to another arbitrary bundle of factor exposures, which may or may not be consistent with the investor's needs and beliefs.
On the other hand, index providers have also launched so-called factor indices, which focus on addressing the second shortcoming of CW indices: their lack of controlled factor exposure. 4 Such factor indices are meant to be investable long-only or longshort proxies for some of the rewarded factors that have been analyzed in academic literature, such as the value factor, the size factor, the momentum factor, or the lowvolatility factor. 5 One problem with these factor indices, however, is that they fail to address the first problem: the excessive concentration problem, which leads to the presence of unrewarded risk. This is because the weighting scheme used in the design of factor indices is either CW (leading to an excessive degree of concentration) or factor-exposure maximizing (which also leads to a lack of diversification).
In a nutshell, CW indices suffer from two main problems: the presence of excessive concentration and the presence of an underlying arbitrary set of factor exposures. Existing alternatives (namely smart indices or factor indices) are reasonably successful attempts at addressing one of these problems, but they leave the other problem unattended. In the end, risk factors are like vectors: they are defined through the direction to which they point, but also through their size. Having access to a good proxy for a factor is hardly relevant if the investable proxy only gives access to a fraction of the fair reward per unit of risk to be expected from the factor exposure, because of the presence of unrewarded risk, due to excessive concentration. This article's first contribution is to demonstrate that it is feasible to address two problems simultaneously through the use of smart-factor indices, which are smart (meaning well-diversified) indices with selected factor exposures that naturally combine the benefits of smart indices and the benefits of factor indices. In brief, smartfactor indices are meant to be the outcome of a process that carefully distinguishes the security-selection stage from the portfolio construction process. 6 The securityselection stage is meant to ensure that the right factortilt will be associated with each index. For example, an investor would select a set of value stocks to construct a proxy for a value factor, or a set of low-volatility stocks to construct a proxy for the low-volatility factor. Additionally, the portfolio construction phase is meant to seek to diversify away unrewarded risk as much as possible, by using some naïve or scientific approach to diversification. As such the factor index is made "smart," that is, better diversified, and the investor can hope to gain a larger fraction of the reward (Sharpe ratio) associated with these factors.
This article's second contribution is to introduce a formal framework that investors can use to allocate to the various smart-factor indices, once they have been carefully constructed. This portfolio construction process distinguishes from the unconditional approach, in which the investor seeks the optimal exposure to risk factors that are rewarded in the long term, by using a sophisticated risk allocation framework. A sound approach to smart-factor index allocation requires the proper execution of three different steps.
• Choice of factors that are rewarded in the long term. • Designing factor-tilted portfolios that capture the fair risk-adjusted reward associated with exposure to the factor • Choice of a methodology for deriving the optimal multi-factor exposures.
This article focuses on these steps. In the next section, we describe the selection of appropriate factors. Then we describe the design of well-diversified factor indices and compare them with the conventional approach to factor indices. The third section presents a set of robustness checks (implementation issues and conditional performance) and an outlook on the use of smart-factor indices in multi-factor allocations. The last section provides conclusions.
IDENTIFICATION OF A SUITABLE SET OF LONG-TERM REWARDED FACTORS
In this section, we review the empirical assetpricing literature to identify the factors that are most likely to bear a long-term reward. Both equilibrium models such as Merton's [1973] inter-temporal capital asset-pricing model and no-arbitrage models such as Ross's [1976] arbitrage pricing theory allow for the existence of risk factors with multiple prices. The economic intuition for the existence of a reward for a given risk factor is that exposure to such a factor is undesirable for the average investor, because it leads to losses in bad times when marginal utility is high (Cochrane [2001] ). Although asset-pricing theory provides a sound rationale for the existence of multiple factors, theory provides little guidance on which factors investors should expect to be rewarded.
The first-order necessary condition for a factor to be deemed important is the existence of empirical research that shows that the identified factor has a significant effect on the cross-section of stock returns in U.S. and international equity markets. Literature has documented several systematically rewarded risk factors; Harvey et al. [2013] document a total of 314 of such factors. The practice of identifying empirical factors is called factor fishing. Therefore, investors must have a clear economic intuition about why exposure to a particular factor constitutes a systematic risk that requires a reward and is likely to continue producing a positive risk premium 7 if they are to accept factors as relevant in their investment process.
In this article, we focus on four well-known, rewarded factors: size, value, momentum, and low volatility. Fama and French showed that value (bookto-market) and size (market cap) explain average asset returns, as a complement to the market beta (Fama and French [1993] ). Carhart [1997] empirically proved the existence of another priced factor: the momentum factor. The low-volatility factor, which qualifies as an anomaly rather than as a risk factor, is the result of the famous volatility puzzle, which states that low-volatility stocks tend to outperform high-volatility stocks in the long run (Ang et al. [2006] ). 8
Empirical Illustration
Exhibit 1 shows the returns of signal-weighted quintile portfolios that represent portfolios with varying degrees of exposure to each factor. Signal weighting is done by weighting the stocks in proportion to their rank by relevant sorting characteristic, following Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen [2013] . For example, in any value quintile consisting of 100 stocks, the stock with highest bookto-market ratio (B/M) will have 100 times more weight than the stock with lowest B/M. We follow the same rank-based weighting in all quintiles for all factors. The difference between value and growth quintiles is 11.62%; that between mid-cap and large-cap quintiles is 4.97%.
The debate about the existence of positive premia for these factors is far from closed. Although positive premia for these factors are documented in an extensive literature, some authors question the robustness or the persistence of the reward associated with these factors. 9 In fact, one can argue that empirical evidence will not be sufficient to draw a clear conclusion as to which set of factors are acceptable for a given investors. Empirical results always carry a risk of data mining, that is, strong and statistically significant factor premia may be a result of many researchers searching through the same dataset to find publishable results (see Harvey et al. [2013] , for example). Therefore, the choice of relevant factors should consider the economic rationale behind the reward for a given factor (see Kogan and Tian [2013] ). The following subsection explains why investors should expect a reward for the four main risk factors discussed in this article. Moreover, simple, straightforward factor definitions may be useful in avoiding the risk of data mining complex and unproven factor definitions. 10 Economic Rationale Choi [2013] shows that value firms suffer from losses in bad times because they have increasing betas in down markets (due to rising asset betas and rising leverage); growth firms have more stable betas. Zhang [2005] argues that value firms are much more affected by bad times because their stock prices are mainly made up of tangible assets that are hard to reduce; growth firms' stock prices are mainly driven by growth options. Lakonishok et al. [1994] conclude that "value strategies exploit the suboptimal behavior of the typical investor," that is, their psychological tendency to extrapolate recent developments into the future and to ignore evidence that is contrary to the extrapolation. Fama and French [1995] show that small stocks, even after adjusting for book-to-market effects, tend to have lower return on equity and greater uncertainty of earnings and are therefore more sensitive to economic shocks. Other explanations for the size premium have been provided, based on low liquidity (Amihud and Mendelsson [1986] ) and high downside risk (Chan et al. [1985] ). Some practitioners explain momentum with the sensitivity of past winning stocks to expected growth (Liu and Zhang [2008] ) and with investors short-term overreactions (Daniel et al. [1998] ). Frazzini and Pedersen [2014] provide a model in which liquidity-constrained investors are able to invest in leveraged positions of low-beta assets but are forced to liquidate these assets in bad times, when their liquidity constraints mean they can no longer sustain the leverage. Thus, low-risk assets are exposed to a risk of liquidity shocks, and investors are compensated for this risk when holding low-beta assets. Behavioral explanations for the low-risk premium argue that high-risk stocks tend to have low returns because irrational investors bid up prices beyond their rational value. The low-volatility premium has been explained through leverage constraints and investors' lottery preferences (Baker et al. [2011] ).
SMART-FACTOR INDICES: TURNING RISK INTO A CHOICE, RATHER THAN A FATE

Conventional Approach to Factor Indices
Factor indices fall into two major categories. The first involves selecting stocks that are most exposed to the desired risk factor and applying a cap-weighting scheme to this selection. Although this approach responds to one limitation of cap-weighted indices-namely the choice of exposure to a good factor-the problem of poor diversification arising from high concentration in a small number of stocks remains unanswered. The second method involves maximizing the exposure to a factor, either by weighting the whole of the universe on the basis of the exposure to this factor (score/rank
E X H I B I T 1 Performance of Quintile Portfolios Sorted by Factors and Weighted by Rank
The exhibit shows mean annualized returns of quintile portfolios. For each factor, the quintiles are constructed on related stock characteristics: market cap for size, B/M for value, past one-year minus one-month returns for momentum, and past two-year volatility for low volatility. Stocks in each quintile are rank weighted. All portfolios are rebalanced quarterly and the analysis is based on daily total returns from 31/12/1972 to 31/12/2012 (40 years). weighting) or by selecting and weighting according to the exposure score of the stock to that factor. Here again, maximizing the factor exposure does not guarantee that the indices are well diversified.
To overcome these difficulties, index providers that generally offer factor indices on the basis of the first two approaches have recently sought to take advantage of the development of smart-beta indices, to offer investors a new framework for factor investing (Bender et al. [2013] ). In fact, index providers have recognized that the traditional factor indices they previously offered are not good investable proxies of the relevant risk factors, due to their poor diversification, and that the smart-beta indices that aim to improve diversification have implicit risk exposures.
As a result, providers are proposing to select and combine indices according to their implicit factor exposures. For example, one could seek exposure to the value factor through a fundamental-weighted index. However, this will not produce a well-diversified index, simply because the integration of the attributes characterizing the value exposure into the weighting does not take the correlations between these stocks into account. Moreover, the value tilt is an implicit result of the weighting methodology, and it is questionable whether an investor seeking a value tilt would wish to hold any weight in growth stocks, which are present in a fundamentally weighted index. Similarly, seeking exposure to the size factor through equal weighting of a broad universe is certainly less effective than selecting the smallest stocks in the universe and then diversifying them, including an equally weighted weighting scheme. Furthermore, a minimum-volatility portfolio on a broad universe does not guarantee either the highest exposure to low-volatility stocks or the best diversification of this low-volatility portfolio. As the examples show, the drawback of this approach is that it maximizes neither factor exposure nor diversification of the indices. Factor indices that belong to the first generation of smart-beta products cannot be expected to provide satisfactory control of rewarded risks or diversification of the unrewarded risks.
A New Approach to Smart-Factor Indices
An important challenge in factor index construction is to design well-diversified factor indices that capture rewarded risks while avoiding unrewarded risks. We draw on a second generation of smart-beta strategies that let investors explore different smart-beta index construction methods in order to construct a benchmark that corresponds to their own choices of factor tilt and diversification method. It allows investors to manage their exposure to systematic risk factors and diminish their exposure to unrewarded, strategyspecific risks (see and Amenc and Goltz [2013] ).
Stock selection, the first step in index construction, lets investors choose the right (rewarded) risk factors to which they want exposure. When performed on a particular stock-based characteristic linked to stocks' specific exposure to a common factor, such as size, stock selection lets investors shift this specific factor exposure, regardless of the weights that will be applied to individual portfolio components.
A well-diversif ied weighting scheme allows reducing unrewarded or specific risks. Stock-specific risk (such as management decisions, product success, and so on) is reduced through the use of a suitable diversification strategy. However, due to imperfections in the model, there remain residual exposures to unrewarded strategy specific risks. For example, minimum-volatility portfolios are often exposed to significant sector biases. Similarly, in spite of all the attention paid to the quality of model selection and the implementation methods for these models, the specific operational risk remains present, to certain extent. For example, the robustness of the maximum Sharpe ratio scheme depends on a good estimation of the covariance matrix and expected returns. Optimized portfolio strategies' parameter estimation errors are not perfectly correlated and therefore have the potential to be diversified away (Kan and Zhou [2007] ; ). A diversified multi-strategy approach 11 that combines f ive popular smart beta weighting schemes in equal proportions lets investors diversify away the non-rewarded risks associated with each of the weighting schemes.
The f lexible index-construction process used in second-generation smart-beta indices thus lets us harness the full benefits of smart beta, where the stock selection defines exposure to the right (rewarded) risk factors and the smart-weighting scheme lets us reduce unrewarded risks.
We now turn to an empirical analysis of U.S. longterm data on a set of multi-strategy factor indices constructed for the four main factors introduced earlier. 12 All indices are rebalanced quarterly and dividends are reinvested in the index. The analytics on U.S. indices in subsequent sections use 40 years of daily total returns. We obtain stock-level data for portfolio construction and portfolio valuation from CRSP. We first assess the achievement of the desired factor tilts and then assess risk-adjusted performance.
Obtaining Exposure to Desired Rewarded Risk Factors
First we examine how well these multi-strategy factor indices fulfill their first objective, that is, to provide exposure to the desired risk factor. Exhibit 2 shows the Carhart four-factor regression statistics for the multistrategy factor indices and cap-weighted (poorly diversified) factor indices. The mid-cap multi-strategy index has a size beta of 0.32; the high-momentum multistrategy index has a momentum beta of 0.17; and the value-tilted index has a value beta of 0.31. Similarly, the low-volatility, smart-factor index has low market beta (0.78); low-market-beta stocks are usually also lowvolatility stocks. Cap-weighted indices, by construction, load heavily on a few large-cap stocks. Therefore, any alternative to cap weighting, especially diversificationbased weighting schemes that aim to be less concentrated, induce an exposure to the small-cap factor. As a result, smart-factor indices have small size exposures as well. However, it is important to note that the magnitude of small-size beta is largest for the smart-factor index that is explicitly exposed to small size, that is, the
E X H I B I T 2
Exposure of USA Cap-Weighted Factor Indices and USA Multi-Strategy Factor Indices to Equity Risk Factors
The exhibit shows four-factor regression analysis indicators for cap-weighted factor indices and multi-strategy factor indices for four factor tilts: mid cap, high momentum, low volatility, and value. The market factor is the daily return of the cap-weighted index of all stocks in excess of the risk-free rate. The small-size factor is long the cap-weighted portfolio of market-cap deciles six to eight (NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX) and short the cap-weighted portfolio of the largest 30% of stocks. The value factor is long the cap-weighted portfolio of the highest 30% and short the cap-weighted portfolio of lowest 30% of B/M stocks. The high-momentum factor is long the cap-weighted portfolio of the highest 30% and short the cap-weighted portfolio of the lowest 30% of 52-week (minus the most recent four weeks) past-return stocks. The regression coefficients (betas and alphas) that are statistically significant at the 95% level are highlighted in bold. The complete stock universe consists of the 500 largest stocks in the U.S. The yield on secondary-market, three-month U.S. Treasury bills is the risk-free rate. All statistics are annualized. The analysis is based on daily total returns from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 mid-cap diversified multi-strategy index (0.32). The average small-size beta for other three smart-factor indices is 0.12. Similarly, the momentum-diversified, multi-strategy index has a momentum beta of 0.17, compared with the 0.01 average for other indices. The value-diversified, multi-strategy index has a value beta of 0.31, compared to an average of 0.13 for other indices.
The exercise shows that the simple stock-selection process (before optimization) results in portfolios that have desired exposure ex post. If we want a strong factor tilt, using stock selection is the most transparent and simple way to achieve it. In other words, a careful distinction between security selection and weighting scheme allows investors to turn risk into "a choice rather than a fate," to paraphrase an insightful comment by the late Peter Bernstein [1996] ).
Avoiding Unrewarded Risk: Creating Well-Diversified, Single-Beta Indices
Exhibit 3 presents an absolute performance summary of the four multi-strategy factor indices, compared with those of cap-weighted factor indices. As the broad cap-weighted index remains the widely accepted reference, we use the broad cap-weighted index based on the 500 largest stocks as the benchmark. All factor-tilted portfolios, irrespective of the weighting scheme used, outperform the broad cap-weighted index. This verifies that the four chosen risk factors do earn, on average, a positive risk premium in the long run.
For each factor tilt, the multi-strategy factor index earns higher returns than does the cap-weighted factor index for the same tilt. Value and mid cap have been the most rewarding factors in the last 40 years in the U.S. market. Mid cap and value smart-factor indices earn a premium of 4.45% and 4.70% annually, respectively. Low-volatility and high momentum are comparatively less rewarded; however, their smart-factor indices earned 2.90% and 3.56% excess returns, respectively. If one looks at risk-adjusted performance, multi-strategy factor indices consistently post Sharpe ratios that are superior to those of cap-weighted factor indices. Historical daily 5% value at risk and maximum drawdown of multi-strategy factor indices and cap-weighted factor indices are similar. This shows that increased performance and reduced portfolio risk do not come at the cost of extreme risk.
Both multi-strategy and cap-weighted factor indices are exposed to systematic risk factors that are quite different from those of the broad cap-weighted index. The reward to these risk factors varies over time, and they experience periods of underperformance, relative to the broad market. Consequently, all factor indices are exposed to relative risk, that is, the risk of underperforming the broad cap-weighted benchmark in the short term, which is shown by maximum relative drawdown numbers.
Also, one must not forget that multi-strategy factor indices have a limited set of securities to diversify across, as they are constructed on 50% of the stock universe. This induces considerable tracking error, relative to the broad cap-weighted index. However, this tracking error is not a drawback if associated outperformance is high enough, which is the case with multi-strategy factor indices, suggesting that they harvest the relevant factor premia in an efficient way. In fact, the results show that the information ratio of the multi-strategy factor indices range from 0.47 for low volatility to 0.81 for value. 13 We also report the historical probability of outperforming the benchmark. Across the four factors, the multi-strategy factor indices have a higher probability of outperformance than do their cap-weighted counterparts. 14 This outperformance of smart-factor indices over traditional factor indices is not surprising. In fact, a lack of diversification has been identified as a major drawback of cap-weighted indices. When it comes to factor-tilted indices, multi-strategy factor indices show considerable improvement both over the broad cap-weighted index and the cap-weighted factor index. We report the effective number of stocks (ENS), 15 which can be used as a measure of deconcentration. An index with balanced weights will have a high ENS. Going a step further and taking correlations into account, we also report the ratio of portfolio variance to the weighted variance of its constituents (GLR ratio from Goetzmann et al. [2005] 16 ) as a measure of diversification. A weighting scheme that exploits correlations to bring down a portfolio's volatility will have a low GLR ratio.
Exhibit 3 shows that multi-strategy factor indices are in fact better diversified, as they have considerably higher ENS and lower GLR ratio than their cap-weighted counterparts. For their part, cap-weighted factor indices display high GLR ratios and-with the exception of the mid cap factor 17 -a low effective number of stocks, suggesting that, although they may improve the exposure to rewarded risk factors, compared with the broad capweighted index, they actually aggravate the concentration problem. In contrast, multi-strategy, factor-tilted indices obtain the desired factor tilts without undue concentration, which provides an explanation for their superior risk-adjusted performance.
ASSESSING ROBUSTNESS
Implementation Concerns
Smart-beta strategies, in their unaltered form, often incur large turnover and are exposed to liquidity risk: the risk of investing a substantial amount in illiquid stocks. Both these limitations can result in high transaction costs and other operational hurdles, such as large trading times during strategy implementation. The multi-strategy index performance reported here relates to portfolios that have been subjected to turnover control 18 and capacity adjustments, 19 which ensure easy implementation of these strategies.
Indeed, with the exception of momentum tilt, all smart-factor indices have one-way annual turnover in the range of 22% to 25%, which is well below the threshold of 30%. 20 Because multi-strategy factor indices aim to replace active investing, turnover's effect on performance, not absolute turnover, is the matter of concern. Transaction cost of 20 basis points per 100% one-way turnover represents the worst case observed
E X H I B I T 3 Performance Comparison of U.S. Cap-Weighted Factor Indices and U.S. Multi-Strategy Factor Indices
The exhibit shows the absolute performance, relative performance, and diversification indicators for cap-weighted factor indices and multistrategy factor indices for four factor tilts: mid cap, high momentum, low volatility, and value. Probability of outperformance is the historical empirical probability of outperforming the benchmark over a typical investment horizon of three or five years, irrespective of the entry point in time. Maximum relative drawdown is the maximum drawdown of the long-short index whose return is given by the fractional change in the ratio of the strategy index to the benchmark index. The GLR measure is defined as the ratio of the portfolio variance to the weighted variance of its constituents. The effective number of stocks (ENS) is defined as the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index, which in turn is defined as the sum of squared weights of portfolio constituents. Complete stock universe consists of the 500 largest stocks in the U.S. The benchmark is the cap-weighted portfolio of the full universe. The yield on secondary market, three-month U.S. Treasury bills is the risk-free rate. The return-based analysis is based on daily total returns from December 31, 1972, to December 31, 2012 (40 years). All weight-based statistics are average values across 160 quarters (40 years) from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 historically, and 100 basis points represents an 80% reduction in market liquidity. The excess returns, net of unrealistically high transaction costs, remain quite significantly high, even for high-momentum indices.
Another widespread criticism of smart-beta strategies is their limited capacity compared with the CW benchmark, which by definition invests very small amounts in smaller and less liquid stocks. Exhibit 4 shows that the weighted average market capitalization of factor indices ranges from $2.73 billion for the mid-cap, multi-strategy index to $13.67 billion for the low-volatility, multi-strategy index, compared with $44.9 billion for the broad CW index. Another way to assess the effect of holding lesser liquid securities is to estimate the number of trading days to enter (or exit) the investment. "Days to trade" is the average number of days required to trade the total stock position in a portfolio of $1 billion, assuming that 100% of average daily traded volume (ADTV) can be traded every day. 21 We report the 95th percentile of this statistic across all stocks and across all rebalancing dates 22 to estimate extremely difficult trades. The results show that all multi-strategy factor indices have extreme trades that can be implemented within about a quarter of a trading day.
We show that multi-strategy factor indices in the U.S. universe, which is based on the 500 largest stocks, do not show any significant illiquidity that could hinder the strategy's smooth implementation. However, it is interesting to assess whether we can further improve liquidity. We thus construct high-liquidity versions of the same portfolios by selecting the top 60% of stocks by liquidity from among the stocks included in the factor-tilted portfolios. Exhibit 5 displays performance and risk characteristics of the resulting high-liquidity, multi-strategy factor indices. As expected, the weighted average market cap and days to trade numbers show significant improvement. Furthermore, the indices maintain most of the original portfolios' outperformance, even though outperformance is reduced by a few basis points. This can be explained by a potential illiquidity premium (Xiong et al. [2009] ).
Conditional Performance
As discussed before, the rewarded factors yield premia in the long term in exchange for risks that can lead to considerable underperformance or relative drawdowns in shorter periods. Therefore, it is important to analyze the time-varying performance of multi-strategy factor indices, in an attempt to identify and characterize the nature of the risk premium. One approach is to use the NBER definition of the business cycle, to break down the analysis period into alternating subperiods of contraction and expansion. 23 In addition to economic cycles, equity market conditions, such as bullish or bearish markets, may have a considerable effect on how different portfolio strategies perform. For example, show considerable variation in the performance of some popular smart-beta strategies in different subperiods, revealing the pitfalls of aggregate performance analysis based on long periods. Moreover, separating bull and bear market periods to evaluate performance has been proposed by various authors, such as Levy [1974] ; Turner et al. [1989]; and Faber [2007] . Ferson and Qian [2004] note that an unconditional evaluation made (for example) during bearish markets will
E X H I B I T 4 Implementation Costs of U.S. Multi-Strategy Factor Indices
The exhibit shows weighted average market cap, turnover, and outperformance, net of transaction costs, of multi-strategy factor indices for four factor tilts: mid cap, high momentum, low volatility, and value. Complete stock universe consists of the 500 largest stocks in the U.S. All statistics are average values across 160 quarters (40 years) from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 not be a meaningful estimation of forward performance if the next period is bullish. It is therefore important to assess performance robustness with respect to such conditions. Exhibit 6 shows annualized excess returns of the four multi-strategy factor indices over the broad CW index in different business cycles and different equity market conditions. Exhibit 6 shows that the performance of multi-strategy factor indices depends on market conditions. For example, the mid-cap multistrategy index posts much higher outperformance in bull markets (+5.37%) than in bear markets (+3.02%). The converse is true for the low-volatility multi-strategy index, which underperforms by 0.81% in bull markets and outperforms by 7.33% in bear markets. Similarly, the mid-cap multi-strategy index has outperformed by a larger margin in expansion phases, while the low-volatility multi-strategy index outperformed in contraction
E X H I B I T 5 Performance of U.S. High-Liquidity Multi-Strategy Factor Indices
The exhibit shows weighted average market cap, turnover, and outperformance, net of transaction costs, of high-liquidity, multi-strategy factor indices for four factor tilts: mid cap, high momentum, low volatility, and value. Complete stock universe consists of the 500 largest stocks in the U.S. All statistics are average values across 160 quarters (40 years) from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 
E X H I B I T 6 Conditional Performance of U.S. Multi-Strategy Factor Indices
The exhibit shows relative performance of multi-strategy factor indices for four factor tilts-mid cap, high momentum, low volatility, and value-and in two distinct market conditions-bull markets and bear markets-and in contraction and expansion phases of the U.S. economy (NBER). Calendar quarters with positive market index returns comprise bull markets; the rest constitute bear markets. Complete stock universe consists of the 500 largest stocks in the U.S. The benchmark is the cap-weighted portfolio of the full universe. All statistics are annualized. The analysis is based on daily total returns from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 phases. This difference in sensitivities to market conditions suggests room for improvement through allocating across multiple multi-strategy factor indices. We turn to this issue in the next subsection.
Usage of Smart-Factor Indices
Risk factors carry time-varying risk premia (Asness [1992] ; Cohen et al. [2003] ). In the previous section, we found that the performance of multi-strategy factor indices depends on market conditions and that a period favorable to one factor may be detrimental to another. Allocating across factors may thus allow investors to diversify the sources of their outperformance and smooth their performance across market conditions. Investors may use allocation across factor tilts to target an absolute (Sharpe ratio or volatility) or relative risk (information ratio, tracking error with respect to the broad CW index) objective. To illustrate the potential of multi-factor allocations, we perform two multi-beta allocations: equal weight (EW) and equal risk contribution (ERC). The equal weight allocation, which is a simple and robust allocation in terms of absolute risk, invests one quarter in each of the four multi-strategy factor indices. The equal risk contribution allocation combines the four multi-strategy factor indices so as to equalize their contributions to the tracking error risk. This method is the relative risk version of the ERC approach of Maillard et al. [2010] , who equalize contributions to portfolio volatility.
E X H I B I T 7
Performance of U.S. Multi-Beta Multi-Strategy Indices
The exhibit shows the absolute performance, relative performance, diversification indicators, and implementation costs of a multi-beta, multistrategy EW index and a multi-beta, multi-strategy ERC Index. Complete stock universe consists of the 500 largest stocks in the U.S. The benchmark is the cap-weighted portfolio of the full universe. The yield on secondary market, three-month U.S. Treasury bills is the risk-free rate. All statistics are annualized. The return-based analysis is based on daily total returns from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 . All weight-based statistics are average values across 160 quarters (40 years) from December 31, 1972 , to December 31, 2012 Exhibit 7 summarizes the performance of multibeta, multi-strategy EW and multi-beta, multi-strategy ERC indices. Due to relatively lower levels of tracking error, these multi-beta, multi-strategy indices exhibit higher information ratios and higher outperformance probabilities than does their average component smartfactor index (compare Exhibit 3). Another important consequence of combining factor tilts is that multi-beta, multi-strategy indices mitigate the risk of choosing a single factor index and produce more stable outperformance across bull and bear markets, with information ratios that are almost indistinguishable in bull and bear markets. From an implementation perspective, the multifactor allocations lower the turnover relative to the average turnover of their component indices, as some of the trades cancel across the different factor tilts. Allocation across several smart-factor indices thus offers both implementation and performance benefits. Although the construction of a multi-factor benchmark ultimately depends on an investor's selection of factors and a choice of a suitable allocation method that take into account the investor's context and constraints, the illustrative examples provide evidence that well-diversified factor indices can be employed as suitable building blocks to harvest additional benefits from multi-factor allocation decisions.
CONCLUSIONS
This article argues that current smart-beta investment approaches only provide a partial answer to the main shortcomings of cap-weighted indices and develops a new approach to equity investing, referred to as smartfactor investing. It then provides an assessment of the benefits of addressing the two main problems of capweighted indices (their undesirable factor exposures and their heavy concentration) simultaneously, by constructing factor indices that explicitly seek exposures to rewarded risk factors while diversifying away unrewarded risks.
The results suggest that such smart-factor indices lead to considerable improvements in risk-adjusted performance. For long-term U.S. data, smart-factor indices for a range of different factor tilts roughly double the Sharpe ratio of the broad cap-weighted index. Moreover, such indices' outperformance persists at levels ranging from 2.92% to 4.46%, even when we assume unrealistically high transaction costs. Moreover, by providing explicit tilts to consensual factors, such indices improve upon many current smart-beta offerings, where (more often than not) factor tilts result as unintended consequences of ad hoc methodologies.
Investors may employ such smart-factor indices as high-performance portfolio-building blocks in a variety of contexts. First, single-factor tilts may be used as substitutes for actively managed or passive cap-weighted portfolios with the same factor tilt. For example, one may consider replacing a mandate tracking a cap-weighted value index with one tracking a value smart-factor index. Second, smart-factor indices for a single-factor tilt may be used as a complement. For instance, one may usefully complement a value-oriented, actively managed portfolio or a value-oriented, alternative index portfolio (such as a fundamentally weighted portfolio) through a smart-factor index representing a complementary tilt (e.g., momentum or low volatility). Third, smartfactor indices are natural building blocks for multi-factor allocations. Indeed, our earlier illustration shows that multi-factor allocations lead to pronounced improvements in risk-adjusted returns when investors combine factors that have low correlation with each other, as well as significant easing of implementation through internal crossing of trades across different factor tilts. In practice, one could further add value over the allocations described in this article by taking into account the investor's constraints, liabilities, and broad investment context in custom smart-beta allocations.
A P P E N D I X COMPARISON ACROSS REGIONS
Having shown the robustness of multi-strategy factor indices using U.S. long-term track records, we test the consistency of their performance across different developed stock markets. Due to the limited availability of reliable data for non-U.S. markets, the analyzed time period is December 31, 2003 , to December 31, 2013 . The multi-strategy factor indices and CW indices are governed by the same methodology described for the U.S. data; the only difference across regions is the number of stocks. Stock universe sizes for developed regions are: U.S. (500), Eurozone (300), U.K. (100), Japan (500), and Asia Pacific ex Japan (400).
Exhibit A1 shows that all multi-strategy factor indices exhibit Sharpe ratios that are superior to those of the broad CW index and their respective CW factor indices. The four multi-strategy factor indices have information ratios that are usually higher than those of CW factor indices and often reach impressive levels, such as 0.84 for U.S. value and 0.69 for U.K. momentum.
Since the analysis period is very short, certain CW factor indices in certain regions do not necessary outperform the broad CW index, despite being tilted toward the longterm rewarded factors. This is the problem of sample-time dependency. For example, the Japan high-momentum CW and U.K. value CW indices have excess return of −0.45% and −2.27%, respectively, in the 10-year period. The benefit of using a well-diversified weighting scheme is more visible in these cases, as their corresponding multi-strategy factor indices outperform by 1.22% and 1.77%.
E X H I B I T A 1
Performance of Multi-Strategy Factor Indices in Developed Markets
The exhibit shows the absolute and relative performance of multi-strategy factor indices in five developed regions for four factor tilts: mid cap, high momentum, low volatility, and value. Developed universes and their respective stock universe sizes are: U.S. (500), Eurozone (300), U.K. (100), Japan (500), and Developed Asia Pacific ex-Japan (400). Benchmark is the cap-weighted index on the full universe for each region. The risk-free rate used for these regions is the secondary market three-month U.S. T-bill, three-month Euribor, three-month U.K. T-bill, one-month Japan Gensaki T-bill, and the secondary-market three-month U.S. T-bill, respectively. All statistics are annualized. The analysis is based on daily total returns from December 31, 2003 , to December 31, 2013 .
ENDNOTES
1 Estimates of the total assets managed in smart-beta funds or mandates are notoriously hard to get with sufficient reliability, as data on dedicated mandates, which likely play a considerable role for smart-beta adoption by sophisticated institutional clients, are not available publicly, and identification of the smart-beta category is difficult. However, some observers put the total assets at $200 billion as of 2013. This number is cited online at in http://www.top1000funds.com/ analysis/2013/05/29/pushing-smart-beta-further/. In July 2013, The Economist estimates the assets managed in smartbeta funds to be $142 billion ("The Rise of Smart Beta," The Economist, July 2013). CNBC (Smart Beta: Beating the Market with an Index Fund," November 7, 2013, www.cnbc. com/id/101149598) reported that about 7% of ETF assets are linked to smart-beta indices and such ETFs have seen a 43% growth over 2013, compared with 16% growth of the overall ETF market. Investment consultancy firm Towers Watson has stated that its institutional clients had allocated about $20 billion to smart-beta strategies at the end of 2012, an increase of 33% over levels seen one year earlier (See www.next-finance. net/Smart-Beta-strategies-continue-to).
2 Unrewarded risks can be risks specific to a particular company or systematic risk exposure for which no reward is expected. It can be shown that for a factor model with the assumption of zero alpha and replicable factors, the specific risk of the true (long-short) MSR portfolio is zero. 3 In fact, scientific and naïve approaches to diversification are not competing approaches; in particular, introducing some form of shrinkage of the scientifically diversified portfolio toward a naively diversified (equal-weight or equal-risk parity) portfolio has been shown to improve the out-of-sample risk-adjusted performance. 4 Fundamental indices and other indices that weight stocks according to some fundamental measure of economic size (Arnott et al. [2005] ) do not explicitly try to improve the concentration problem, nor do they explicitly aim at addressing the problem of inefficient factor exposure. This is the reason we do not include these indices in the aforementioned list of recent innovations. Such approaches can be regarded as ad-hoc attempts at constructing an index based on a measure of company size that is different from market cap. 5 The low-volatility factor is in fact an anomaly, because it stipulates that the most risky stocks underperform, as opposed to outperforming, the least risky stocks (Ang et al. [2006] ; Baker et al. [2011] ; Bali et al. [2011] ). 6 This careful distinction lies at the heart of the smartbeta 2.0 approach (Amenc and Goltz [2013] ). 7 Not all investors are necessarily interested in harvesting every available risk premium. In fact, some investors prefer to pay the premium to avoid exposure to a certain risk factor, e.g., in the case of the illiquidity premium. However, some investors could try to capture the reward associated with a risk premium, even if this reward is related to taking on additional risk. For example, although the reward may occur in equilibrium, due to a factor paying off poorly in bad times (when marginal utility of consumption is high), investors who have a particularly long time horizon may be less sensible to such risks. Long-horizon investors may thus be particularly inclined to seek exposure to such rewarded factors, while short-term investors may shy away due to the associated risk. 8 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an exhaustive analysis of all rewarded risk factors. For example, we do not include a quality factor, which is another recently documented risk factor. This factor could be based on a simple company attribute, such as gross profitability (Novy-Marx [2013] ), or more complex composite measures, such as a combination of profitability, growth, safety, and dividend payout (Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen [2013] ). We have chosen to exclude this factor, as empirical evidence for it is much more recent and its definition less consensual than for the factors included in this article. However, the conceptual arguments we make in this article carry through to any rewarded risk factors. 9 As an example, consider the ongoing debate on the low-risk premium. Early empirical evidence suggests that the relation between systematic risk (stock beta) and return is f latter than predicted by the CAPM (Black et al. [1972] ). More recently, Ang et al. [2006 Ang et al. [ , 2009 find that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have had low returns. Other papers have documented a f lat or negative relation between total volatility and expected return. However, a number of recent articles have questioned the robustness of such results and show that the findings are not robust to changes to portfolio formation (Bali and Cakici [2008] ) or to adjusting for short-term return reversals (Huang et al. [2010] ). More generally, McLean and Pontiff [2013] assess empirically whether risk premia for a range of factors have remained significant after the effect has been widely publicized. 10 It has been argued that value-tilted indices, which draw on proprietary and ad-hoc definitions of composite scores, such as commercially available, fundamentally weighted indices, are highly sensitive to the methodological choices made in the index construction process (see Blitz and Swinkels [2008] and Amenc [2011] , for example). 11 Diversified multi-strategy weighting is an equally weighted combination of five weighting schemes: maximum deconcentration diversified risk weighted, maximum decorrelation, efficient minimum volatility, and efficient maximum Sharpe ratio. 12 The following selection rules are applied to select stocks for each tilt. Mid cap: bottom 50% free-f loat-adjusted market-cap stocks are selected. Value: top 50% stocks are selected by book-to-market ratio. B/M is defined as the ratio of available book value of shareholders' equity to company market cap. High momentum: top 50% stocks are selected by returns over past 52 weeks, minus the last four weeks. Low volatility: bottom 50% stocks are selected by their standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the past 104 weeks. This score-based selection is done twice a year ( June and December) for momentum and once a year ( June) for the other three factors. Multi-strategy factor indices are constructed by applying the diversified multi-strategy weighting scheme; CW factor indices are constructed by applying f loatadjusted market-cap weighting to each stock selection. 13 Within the framework of smart-beta 2.0, one could choose to put tracking-error constraints in smart-factor indices. Details on relative risk control can be found in Goltz and Gonzalez [2013] . However, this is not desirable, because tracking error constraints increase the correlation among smart-factor indices and thus reduce the diversification benefits of their combination. A more practical approach to manage tracking-error risk would be to put constraint on smart-factor allocation, rather than putting it on each smartfactor index. 14 We compute the frequency of obtaining positive excess returns if one invests in the strategy for a period of three or five years and computes returns using a rollingwindow analysis with a one-week step size. 15 The effective number of stocks (ENS) is defined as the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index, which in turn is defined as the sum of squared weights across portfolio constituents, where N is the total number of stocks in the portfolio and W i is the weight of i-th stock. 16 Denoting R P as the daily return series of an index, R i is the daily return series of the i-th stock, and W i the weight of i-th stock, the GLR ratio is defined as
17 Mid-cap selection picks up the bottom 250 market-cap stocks in the broad U.S. universe. The weight profile of these stocks is f latter, meaning that the difference in market cap of the largest and smallest stock is not very high. Therefore, the mid-cap CW index does not necessarily suffer from the problem of high concentration.
18 For multi-strategy factor indices, turnover is managed through optimal control of rebalancing the indices, a technique based on rebalancing thresholds (see Leland [1999] and Martellini and Priaulet [2002] ). At each quarterly rebalancing, the new optimized weights are implemented only if the resulting overall weight change remains above the threshold. The threshold is calibrated using the past data, and it is fixed at a level that would have resulted in not more than a 30% annual one-way turnover historically. This rule avoids rebalancing when deviations of new optimal weights from the current weights are relatively small. This technique brings down transaction costs to a large extent without having a big impact on the strategy's performance. In the case of the diversified multi-strategy weighting scheme, turnover control is applied to the five constituent strategies before combining them. 19 The following capacity rules are applied to limit liquidity issues that may arise upon investing and upon rebalancing. Under the holding-capacity rule, the weight of each stock is capped, to avoid large investment in the smallest stocks. Under the trading-capacity rule, the change in each stock's weight is capped, to avoid large trades in small illiquid stocks at the rebalancing. Formally, we adjust weights so that, W i,I ≤ 10. W i,CW ∀ i ∈ [1, N] and ΔW i,I ≤ W i,CW ∀ i ∈ [1, N], where W i,I is the weight of the i-th stock in the multistrategy factor index and W i,CW is the weight of the same stock in a cap-weighted index that comprises the same stocks as the multi-strategy factor index in question. 20 Momentum strategies typically result in high turnover (Chan et al. [1999] ). Momentum-chasing strategies have short time horizons, because persistence in price movement is a short-term phenomenon and mean-reversion is observed in longer horizons. Therefore, to extract momentum premium, momentum score assignment is done semi-annually, which results in higher turnovers. 21 Even if one assumes that only about 10% of average daily traded volume can be traded, one would still get a very reasonable days-to-trade number for the smart-factor indices. 22 The measure is computed for all stocks at each rebalancing in the last 10 years (40 quarters); the 95th percentile is reported. 23 The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee publishes business cycle reference dates, which can be obtained at www.nber.org/ cycles/cyclesmain.html. Contractions start at the peak of a business cycle and end at the trough. Expansions start at the trough and end at the peak.
